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The Artisan Lienholder vs. the Perfected Security
Interest
Donald J. Elardo*
P ROBABLY NO LIEN is a greater favorite of the law than the lien of an
artisan who contributes his labor to create, repair, or enhance the
value of property.1 His is a position long favored under the common
law; and such protection is currently reflected in either state statutes
or controlling case decisions.
An artisan who furnishes labor and materials for the repair of
chattel property has a valid common law lien upon such property for
the reasonable value of his labor and materials while he retains pos-
session of the property.2 A common law lien has been defined as a right
extended to a person to retain that which is in his possession belonging
to another, until the demand or charge of the person in possession is
paid or satisfied.3
Pre-Code Decisions and Rules
Despite its usually favored position, the artisan's lien was long held
subordinate to the perfected interest of a chattel mortgagee. The leading
Ohio case, Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Orlow, held the chattel mort-
gagee in a foreclosure proceeding prior to a mechanic in possession of
an automobile on which the latter had a valid artisan's lien.4 However,
three dissenters to this holding laid down the foundation for that rea-
soning which would later lead to UCC 9-310. 5
Prior to 1912, codified rights of lienholders were non-existent under
Ohio law, and any legislative act attempting to provide such rights in
lienholders would have been struck down as being unconstitutional.6
Only the common law rule was available to the aggrieved artisan.7 In
1912 a constitutional amendment was adopted permitting the passage
* B.A., Baldwin-Wallace College; Systems Representative for RCA-ISD; Fourth-year
student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 National Bond and Investment Co. v. American Auto Hotel Co., 24 Oho N.P. (n.s.)
584 (C. P. Hamilton County 1924).
2 Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Orlow, 107 Ohio St. 583, 140 N.E. 306 (1923).
3 Black's Law Dictionary 346 (4th ed. 1951).
4 Metropolitan Securities v. Orlow, supra note 2.
5 Id., at 595-611.
The Uniform Commercial Code is incorporated into Chapters 1301 to 1309 inclu-
sive, of the Ohio Revised Code. § 9-310 of the Uniform Commercial Code and§ 1309.29 of the Ohio Revised Code are the same. Reference to one is therefore
reference to the other. See note 13 infra.
6 Palmer and Crawford v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St..423, 45 N.E. 313 (1896).
7 Metropolitan Securities v. Orlow, supra note 2.
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of laws to secure for artisan lienholders "their just dues" in furnishing
labor and materials to another's property.8
The majority in Metropolitan held that the amendment was appli-
cable only to real property, and that since no statutes had been enacted
to effectuate the amendment, it was inoperative on the case at bar since
the amendment was not self-executing." The proper recording of the
chattel mortgage by the mortgagee served as constructive notice to all
who would deal with the mortgagor that a prior lien existed; and by no
interpretation of a covenant within the mortgage, that the mortgagor
would maintain the automobile in "first class condition," would the
majority accept the "agency theory" that the mortgagor, by a contract
for repairs, could subordinate the lien of the mortgagee.
The language of Chief Justice Marshall in the Metropolitan opinion
succinctly sets down the rationale of the majority:
The underlying principles (sic) . . . is that the lien which is
prior in time is prior in right, and that the record of the mortgage
is notice to the whole world, including the repair man. It is apparent
that a mortgagee without notice of the intended repairs has no op-
portunity to protect himself, and that he cannot be the judge of
whether repairs are needed, or to what extent such repairs would
enhance the value of the property, or whether the contract for
repairs is a reasonable one; while, on the other hand, the repair man
has every opportunity to fully protect himself before either expend-
ing labor or using materials in repairs. There is no obligation on
his part to do anything, or to incur a penny of expense, until he has
assurance that the property is free from incumbrance. If the person
in possession of the machine, who requests that repairs be made,
cannot give such assurance, the artisan is not bound to proceed. 10
The dissenters argued that the constitutional amendment carried
the force of a statute and was thus self-executing. Moreover, they
argued, the amendment was stated in general terminology and the word
"property" could not be construed so as to preclude personal property.
Indeed, personal property must have been included since a greater pro-
tection of the artisan is required in his dealings therewith because of
the perishable and transitory nature of both the property and its ap-
parent owner.
The majority view was established as precedent and such was
destined to become deep-rooted. A chattel mortgagee who properly
recorded his interest in collateral was prior to any artisan who might
later treat the property.
8 Ohio Const., art. I, § 33.
"Laws may be passed to secure to mechanics, artisans, laborers, sub-contractors
and material men, their just dues by direct lien upon the property, upon which they
have bestowed labor or for which they have furnished material. No other provision
of the constitution shall impair or limit this power."
9 Ohio Rev. Code, §§ 1311.01 to 1311.68 inclusive, were later enacted to implement the
intent obvious in the above amendment.
10 Metropolitan Securities v. Orlow, supra note 2, at 594.
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In National Bond and Investment Co. v. American Auto Hotel Co.,
a similar result was obtained." With Metropolitan controlling, a chattel
mortgagee who had properly recorded his interest was deemed to take
precedence over the owner of a public garage with whom the police had
placed a stolen automobile found on the street.
In Auto Top & Trimming Co. v. American Finance Co., the Metro-
politan rule was again applied with a similar result. 12 A chattel mort-
gagee was held to have a right of action in replevin to regain an auto-
mobile which was in the possession of an artisan lienholder. The
artisan's common law lien for the reasonable value of his services was
not extinguished by his forced loss of possession; but he was relegated
to a status of secondary priority-to take whatever, if anything, remained
after the chattel mortgagee had satisfied his interest.
Thus pre-Code Ohio law clearly placed the artisan lienholder in a
position inferior to the chattel mortgagee who had recorded his interest
and had thereby served constructive notice on all subsequent claimants
who would treat the collateral.
The Uniform Commercial Code
At first glance, UCC 9-310 would seem to reverse the Metropolitan
rule in favor of the artisan lienholder.13 But the lawyer who would
rely on the generality of this section without further investigation may
well encounter some upsetting experiences.
It has been broadly stated that so long as the lienholder retains
possession of the goods on which he has a claim, UCC 9-310 overrides
any pre-Code decisional law to the contrary. 14 How, then, might the
Metropolitan case be decided under UCC 9-310? Would the artisan lien-
holder be favored over the perfected security interest of a prior creditor?
The answer is "yes," if the sweeping generality above is accepted as the
true state of the law; the answer is "no," if UCC 9-310 is examined in
light of its true implication.
Where UCC 9-310 Will Not Affect Pre-Code Law
In Ohio Finance Co. v. Middleton, an artisan's common law lien on
an automobile in his possession was held superior to the properly re-
corded prior lien of a chattel mortgagee.1 5 The court held that, since
11 National Bond v. American Auto Hotel, supra note 1.
12 124 Ohio St. 169, 177 N.E. 217 (1931).
13 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-310; Ohio Rev. Code § 1309.29.
"When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or ma-
terials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon goods in thepossession of such person given by statute or rule of law for such materials or
services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory
and the statute expressly provides otherwise."
14 Hensen, Priorities Under the UCC, 41 Notre Dame Law. 425, 454 (1965).
15 14 Ohio App. 43 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1921).
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the automobile was in the lawful possession of the mortgagor, and since
it was intended, as between mortgagor and mortgagee, that the former
would retain and use the automobile for a long period of time, there had
arisen the latter's implied consent to the mortgagor's undertaking of
repairs on behalf of the mortgagee's collateral interest. In effect, the
mortgagor, having implied authority to preserve the usable condition
of the automobile and enhance its value, was the "agent" of the mort-
gagee for the purpose of making repairs.
Thus liens securing claims arising from work intended to preserve
or enhance the value of collateral, subject to a security interest, have
priority over an earlier security interest even though perfected. 10 This
is true even though the artisan's services or materials are furnished
without the knowledge or approval of the secured party, unless the
declared policy of the legislature provides otherwise. 17 The above rule,
having arisen under pre-Code law, would be the same under UCC 9-310.
Wherein lies the distinction between the factually analogous Metro-
politan and Ohio Finance cases? It lies, however fine it may be, in the
difference between the mortgagee's merely entrusting the chattel to the
mortgagor in which case the claim of the mortgagee is paramount; and
the mortgagee's implied consent that his "agent," the mortgagor, under-
take repairs necessary to preserve the chattel in usable condition, in
which case the artisan lienholder's claim supersedes the priority of the
mortgagee's claim.
Where UCC 9-310 Will Affect Pre-Code Law
In First National Bank of Marysville v. Bahan, the court was faced
with the first instance of a clash between pre-Code decisional rules and
UCC 9-310. i 8 A mechanic who twice rendered services on a mortgagor's
tractor kept possession of it on the second occasion when payment was
not forthcoming. To regain the chattel, the mortgagee bank then sued,
as parties defendant, the mechanic and a second mortgagee bank. The
mechanic, relying on UCC 9-310, maintained that his right to possession
evidenced a higher priority than that of the mortgagee banks. The court
was able to avoid the application of UCC 9-310 by basing its decision
on a procedural tenet. The chattel mortgages had been executed and
recorded prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in
Ohio (July 1, 1962); while the services rendered by the mechanic had
taken place after that time. To give priority to the mechanic would
have raised a constitutional question, both national and state in scope,
involving the impairment of contractual obligations by a legislative
16 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-310, Comment 1.
17 0. Spivack, Secured Transactions, 115 (3rd ed. 1963).
18 26 Ohio Op. 2d 429, 198 N.E.2d 272 (C. P. Champaign County 1964).
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enactment. 19 The court was able to side-step both the constitutional
issue and the issue involving interpretation and application of UCC 9-310
by utilizing another section of the Ohio Revised Code, Section 1301.15.20
In effect, pre-Code law was deemed controlling even though the
Uniform Commercial Code had been adopted prior to the appearance of
this case before the bar. It is interesting to note the court's clarity in
reiterating the Metropolitan rule, long held as the controlling principle
of law in matters of this nature.2 1 It is perhaps more interesting to note
the court's reluctance to speculate as to the essence of UCC 9-310 in its
substantive sense.22
Although the court in the above case avoided the basic question,
UCC 9-310 does change the former rule relating to chattel mortgages
under which filing constituted notice to all, including artisans, repairmen
and mechanics.2 3 UCC 9-310 also changes the pre-Code rule regarding
conditional sales contracts and bailment leases which held that where
the seller or lessor retained "title" to the "collateral," it was beyond the
power of the buyer or lessee to confer priority upon an artisan by order-
ing repairs or improvements to collateral without the consent of the
"owner." 2 4
It is also apparent that the old pre-Code theories and rules regarding
the mortgagor's "agency" or lack of it, however treated by the courts
formerly, have been superseded by the rule of UCC 9-310 and are of
no bearing today. It would appear that a debtor now has the ability,
through the incurrance of liabilities on behalf of the secured collateral,
to elevate an artisan lienholder to a favored position.
19 U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Ohio Const., art. II, § 28.
The test employed in the First National Bank case to determine contractual im-
pairment was whether the legislative enactment altered the obligation in favor of
one party against another, either by enlarging or reducing the obligation?
Clearly, had the court accepted the lienholder's position based on UCC 9-310,
the value in the chattel mortgages held by the banks would have been diminished
by the vaulting of the mechanic into a favored position.
20 Ohio Rev. Code, § 1301.15 (1963).
"Transactions validly entered into before July 1, 1962, and the rights, duties, and
interests flowing from them remain valid thereafter and may be terminated, com-
pleted, consummated, or enforced .... Instruments . . . filed prior to July 1, 1962, in
accordance with the law at the time of such filings shall be deemed to be filed under
1301, 1302, 1304, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1308, and 1309 of the Revised Code as of the
original date in filing and may be continued or terminated as provided in such
chapters."
There is no counterpart to this section in the Uniform Commercial Code since
the matter of effectuating orderly change from pre-Code law is left to the adopting
states.
21 First National Bank v. Bahan, supra note 18 at p. 430.
22 The court, however, does imply that the application of UCC 9-310 would have led
to a result in favor of the mechanic. See First National Bank v. Bahan, supra note
18, at 431.
23 48 Ohio Jur. 2d (Part 2), Secured Transactions § 219 (1966).
24 Spivack, op. cit. supra note 17, at 116.
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The "Unless Clause"
The last statement of the previous section is obviously clothed in
indefinite, non-committal language. This is intended and with good
reason. As intimated above, the lawyer must examine UCC 9-310 care-
fully and necessarily involve himself beyond its terminology. The usual
clarity and conciseness of the Uniform Commercial Code, in general,
must not be permitted to lull him into complacency regarding the multi-
faceted implications of that which is couched in every phrase. It is
especially the last clause of UCC 9-310 that may ensnare the unwary
lawyer should he be cursory or superficial in his research.
UCC 9-310 unequivocally asserts the preference of an artisan lien-
holder over a perfected security interest "unless the lien is statutory
and the statute expressly provides otherwise." 25 That is, if the artisan's
lien is created or codified by statute and such expressly subordinates the
artisan's lien to a prior security interest, UCC 9-310 does not repeal that
statutory provision.
20
The basic questions which the lawyer must recognize and resolve
in dealing with UCC 9-310 include the following:
1. Is the lien common law in nature or has it been codified by
statute?
2. If the latter, what provisions are encompassed within the statute
regarding prior security interests?
3. Is the prior security interest statutorily defined?
4. If so, what provisions within it relate to artisan's or repairmen's
liens?
a. Is the statute silent regarding these, or
b. is there express provision for the priority of the security
interest?
The lawyer must necessarily examine all these questions in light of both
the factual circumstances presented by a problem and the applicable
common law or statutory rules before he can safely undertake a course
of action.
UCC 9-310 Construed
In Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Downtown Lincoln-Mercury Co., the
most significant decision to date was rendered regarding the import of
UCC 9-310.27 Not only was this section applied to the case at bar, but
it was necessarily construed by the court as to its relevance in Ohio.
25 Ohio Rev. Code, supra note 13.
26 Spivack, op. cit. supra note 17, at 116.
27 4 Ohio App.2d 4 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964), a'fd sub nom. Commonwealth Loan Co.
v. Downtown Lincoln Mercury Co., 2 Ohio St. 2d 169, 207 N.E.2d 545 (1965).
For an examination of the construction of UCC 9-310 and the rules arising
therefrom, the decision of the appellate court must be analyzed.
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Its construction and the holding that followed will doubtless be con-
trolling as to all similar problems arising in the future.
Recognizing the latent ambiguity of UCC 9-310, the court sought
"to breathe sense and meaning into it; to give effect to all its terms
and provisions; and to render it compatible with other and related
enactments whenever and wherever possible." 28 The issue in Common-
wealth involved the right to possession of chattel property-an auto-
mobile. Was such right in the secured party (loan company), or in the
holder of an artisan's lien (automobile agency)? Applying UCC 9-310
as construed, the court held for the loan company because of the exist-
ence of the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act.29 The latter, clearly
the most significant statute falling within the "unless clause" of UCC
9-310, expressly provides that a security interest denoted on the cer-
tificate of title is superior to the claim of any subsequent party attaining
an interest in the collateral. 30
To further illustrate the complexities confronting the lawyer in
dealing with UCC 9-310 and, for example, the Motor Vehicle Title Act,
it would be enlightening to examine two other related Ohio statutes,
both of which are relevant in determining the relative priorities as be-
tween the contending parties. First, the old common law artisan's lien
has been made statutory in Ohio. 31 In deference to the Motor Vehicle
Title Act, this statutory lien expressly excludes motor vehicles from its
operation. Thus, as applied to automobiles, the artisan's lien is still
deemed a common law lien and, because of the Title Act, will not be
28 Id., at 6.
The word "lien" appears twice in § 1309.29 (supra note 13). Its first use refers to
the claim of the artisan or mechanic in possession of the collateral; whereas its sec-
ond appearance refers to the claim of the secured interest.
In the simplest terminology, the rule may be more easily understood: "When a
person ... furnishes service or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien upon the goods . . . given by statute or rule of law takes priority
over the security interest unless the security interest is statutory and the statute
provides otherwise."
29 Ohio Rev. Code, § 4505.13 (1961).
"Any security agreement covering a security interest in a motor vehicle, if such
instrument is accompanied by delivery of . . . a certificate of title, if a notation of
such instrument has been made by the clerk of the court of common pleas on the
face of such certificate, shall be valid as against the creditors of the debtor, whether
armed with process or not, and against subsequent purchasers, secured parties, and
other lienholders or claimants."
30 Thus, it is settled in Ohio that the Motor Vehicle Title Act subordinates UCC
9-310. But see Security Interests in Motor Vehicles under the UCC: A Chassis for
Certificate of Title Legislation, 70 Yale L. J. 995, 1014 (1961), where it is argued that
an inquiry into the commercial significance of mechanics liens seems to dictate that
UCC 9-310 be construed as repealing the provisions of any title act subordinating
mechanics liens since such subordination tends to discourage necessary repairs to
the automobile-an instrument vital to modem society.
31 Ohio Rev. Code, § 1333.41 (1963).
"Every bailee for hire performing work or furnishing material on personal prop-
erty other than on motor vehicles . .. at the request of the owner shall have a lien
upon such property for the charge for such work and materials furnished by such
bailee for hire.... ."
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favored.3 2 Secondly, the Ohio Revised Code makes it unnecessary to
file in order to perfect a security interest in automobiles. 33
The statutory interplay is obviously significant thereby causing the
lawyer to extend himself far beyond the boundaries of UCC 9-310 itself.
Other Considerations
Where a statute is silent and does not expressly favor a secured
interest over other claimants, the artisan's lien, by virtue of UCC
9-310, takes priority even though under pre-Code law the statute had
been construed by decision to make his lien subordinate. 34
Any statute, however, may expressly deny the priority of the artisan
lienholder furnished him by UCC 9-310. 35 Thus UCC 9-310 which seem-
ingly favors artisans over prior secured interests does so only where
other statutes do not expressly provide otherwise. It therefore follows
that the lawyer will need to look throughout the Ohio Revised Code to
be assured that he stands on firm footing when interpreting UCC 9-310
within the context of his particular problem.
Conclusion
Just how great a change has been effected through the replacement
of Ohio's pre-Code statutes and decisional rules of law by UCC 9-310?
Certainly not as much as one would estimate after a cursory examina-
tion of UCC 9-310. For example, the Motor Vehicle Title Act has had
the effect of carrying into substantive statutory law the judicial rule
previously laid down in the Metropolitan and subsequent related cases. 36
Today's artisan, in this instance, would fare no better than he did forty-
five years ago. Indeed, the Auto Top case and the Commonwealth case,
analogous in factual circumstance, have yielded the same decisional re-
sult although the two were separated by some thirty-seven years and
were subject to different "codes" of law.
There have been, however, significant changes in favor of the artisan
as has been indicated above. The relationship as to priorities in col-
lateral between the artisan lienholder and the secured party have gen-
erally been reversed. Public policy has finally dictated greater protec-
tion for the artisan whose maintenance of, and enhancements to, col-
lateral unquestionably contribute much to the continuing growth of our
complex economy.
32 Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Downtown Lincoln Mercury Co., supra note 27.
33 Ohio Rev. Code, § 1309.21 (C, 2).
"The filing provisions of Chapter 1309.01 to 1309.50 inclusive, of the Ohio Revised
Code do not apply to a security interest in property subject to a statue of this state
... which . . .requires indication on a certificate of title of such security interests
in such property. . ..
34 Uniform Commercial Code, § 9-310, Comment 2.
35 Commonwealth Loan case, supra note 27.
30 Ibid.
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